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I. INTRODUCTION

It is, at first glance, a seemingly odd anomaly of modem First
Amendment' free-speech jurisprudence. Under obscenity law,2 the
* Professor, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication, and director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fl. B.A.,
1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of
Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member,
State Bar of California. The author thanks Rodney A. Smolla, president of Furman University,
for his support over the years.
1. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated eighty-five years
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local
439
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scope of protection for sexually explicit expression varies from state to
state, dependent upon the perspective of those in the local 3 community.4
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. See
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("[O]bscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press").
3. The "local" community for determining whether material is obscene may be based on
a statewide standard, a more geographically specific standard, such as an area within a state, or
even a non-geographic standard. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). As the U.S.
Supreme Court has observed, "the Constitution does not require that juries be instructed in state
obscenity cases to apply the standards of a hypothetical statewide community. Miller approved
the use of such instructions; it did not mandate their use." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 157. The Court in
Jenkins added:
Miller held that it was constitutionally permissible to permit juries to rely on
the understanding of the community from which they came as to contemporary
community standards, and the States have considerable latitude in framing
statutes under this element of the Miller decision. A State may choose to define
an obscenity offense in terms of "contemporary community standards" as
defined in Miller without further specification, as was done here, or it may
choose to define the standards in more precise geographic terms, as was done
by California in Miller.
Id. For instance, California embraces a statewide standard under its penal code. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 311(a) (West 2009) ("[O]bscenity means matter, taken as a whole, that to the average
person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, that, taken
as a whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" (emphasis added)). In stark
contrast, Indiana's obscenity statute "does not indicate that either a statewide or local standard
shall be employed in reference to community standards" and, instead, represents "a general
standard, not a geographic one," under which "an ideal instruction under the Indiana statute
would refer to neither a statewide nor local region, but would require that contemporary
community standards be determined by what the community as a whole in fact finds
acceptable." Richards v. Indiana, 461 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); see IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-49-2-1(1) (West 2009) (using the phrase "applying contemporary community
standards"). See generally Mark Cenite, Federalizingor Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as
an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 35 (2004)
(observing that the Supreme Court has "held that the community standards test for federal
obscenity prosecutions was local, not national, and not necessarily statewide-the relevant
geographic community could be smaller than an entire state").
4. In articulating the current test used for obscenity, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
what is obscene must be measured by contemporary local community standards, observing that
"[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973). The high court
reasoned that:
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on
the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but this
does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national
standards of precisely what appeals to the "prurient interest" or is "patently
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Why, after all, should the exact same sexually provocative movie or
issue of a "girlie" 5 magazine be protected by a supposedly national
constitutional guarantee in one part of the country but not in another? 6
As Alan Isaacman, former attorney for adult periodical publisher Larry
Flynt 7 and the man who successfully argued the case of Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. FalwellP to the nation's high court, once stated:
offensive." These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too
big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards
could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the
prerequisite consensus exists.
Id. at 30. With this in mind, the Supreme Court in Miller concluded that the test for obscenity
should focus on whether the material at issue: (1) appeals to a prurient interest in sex, when
taken as a whole and as judged by contemporary community standards from the perspective of
the average person; (2) is patently offensive, as defined by state law; and (3) lacks "serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at 24. The high court later reiterated that
"community standards simply provide the measure against which the jury decides the questions
of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness." Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
302 (1977). Community standards, on the other hand, do not apply to the third prong of the
Miller test on the question of whether the material in question lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. See id. at 301 (writing that "[1]iterary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, on the other hand, is not discussed in Miller in terms of contemporary community
standards"). On the third prong of Miller, the Supreme Court has observed that:
Just as the ideas a work represents need not obtain majority approval to merit
protection, neither, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, does the value
of the work vary from community to community based on the degree of local
acceptance it has won. The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member
of any given community would find serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person
would find such value in the material, taken as a whole.
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
5. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968) (using the phrase "'girlie'
picture magazines" to describe non-obscene yet sexually explicit magazines at issue in the case).
6. In the view of some scholars, "[n]onuniformity is antithetical to the very concept of
constitutionalism. .

. ."

Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution:Geographical Variations

of ConstitutionalRequirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1129, 1137 (1999). In
general, "[1]ittle judicial or scholarly attention has been directed to geographical constitutional
nonuniformity as such." Id. at 1135.
7. Flynt and his flagship magazine, Hustler, have been described by one leading
constitutional scholar as "notorious for their dedication to a vivid and perverse pornography."
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 603, 605 (1990).
In somewhat stark contrast, First Amendment scholar and former University of Virginia
President Robert O'Neil has called Flynt a "fascinatingly complex maverick" who reflects a
"paradox of realism and idealism" when it comes to the First Amendment and his business
interests. Robert M. O'Neil, Preface, 9 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 141, 142-43 (2001).
8. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Something may be protected in Des Moines or in New York City
and not in Salt Lake City or Mobile, Alabama. It doesn't make
sense to me that we're all citizens of the same United States and
that a citizen in one place is able to say something and have the
protection of the national constitution while a citizen in another
place in the country can be thrown in jail for saying the same
thing. 9
Obscenity thus functions under what constitutional scholar Mark D.
Rosen dubs "a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters,"' 0 with
each local community interpreting for itself what is and is not
obscene." This situation seems to contradict the notion that, as
Professor John Fee recently observed, "[c]ore First Amendment rights
are the same for all citizens of the United States, wherever they

reside."1 2
This Article demonstrates, however, that it is not only geographic
communities that disrupt the notion of a uniform or generally applicable
First Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, it explores three areas of
law where specific, non-geographic characteristics of the audience-the
viewers or listeners, as it were-at which a message is directed,
conveyed or targeted affects the extent of First Amendment protection
that speech receives.
This Article contends that courts often employ what might be
considered a personalized or customized approach to the evaluation of
message protection-an approach in which there are dueling
assumptions of both:
*
*

generalized norms of message protection that apply when
the audience or target of speech is the mythical average
person; and
niche norms of message protection for specific audiences or
for what Cornell University Professor Benedict Anderson
might call micro "imagined communities."' 3

9. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Alan Isaacman and the First Amendment: A
CandidInterview With Larry Flynt's Attorney, 19 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 323 (2001).
10. Mark D. Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation
of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 927, 995 (2002).
11. See Yuval Karniel & Haim Wismonsky, Pornography,Community and the Internet Freedom of Speech and Obscenity on the Internet, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105,
107 (2004) ("Contrary to regular criminal offenses, which are evaluated against a state or
international standard, American obscenity laws are community-contingent offenses where it is
the standard of the relevant community that determines if a specific distributed pornographic
material is obscene").
12. John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1691, 1706 (2007).
13. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
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These latter micro-communities, unlike those local ones affecting
obscenity law described at the start of this Article, are not defined in
terms of geography (i.e., state-centric standards versus national
standards), but instead by other characteristics such as occupation,
interests and ethnicity. As this Article illustrates, the First Amendment
jurisprudence actually embraces non-geographic nonuniformity in the
areas of obscenity, fighting words, and defamation.
The use of such an audience-shifting approach to measure the
variable, uneven extent of speech protection, this Article asserts,
obliterates the notion of equality in First Amendment application and,
instead, leads to a fractured jurisprudence of what could be considered
"particularist rights"l 4 in which social or occupational identity plays a
pivotal, defining role. Ultimately, what this Article attempts to
demonstrate is a struggle by courts to create, enforce, and reconcile
what purports to be a relatively objective or generalized First
Amendment jurisprudence with uniform rules and "average-person" 5
standards with a jurisprudence that is flexible and subjective enough to
accommodate and to adapt to particular and unique audiences and
identities.
Part II of this Article explores the judicial use of non-geographic,
identity-specific communities in obscenity law to determine whether
sexually explicit expression warrants First Amendment protection.16
Part III then examines the same issue in the area of fighting words,1 7
while Part IV illustrates a problematic use of non-geographic
communities in defamation law that goes far beyond the current, wellestablished distinctions made between whether the target of the libelous
language is a public or private person.' 8 What unites these three areas is
that in each one, the law employs an average-person perspective to
establish an imagined benchmark or baseline for the scope of message
protection, but then it carves out caveats and exceptions that take into
account imagined community-specific perspectives.
Finally, Part V argues that courts muddle the law when they employ
the types of customized, non-geographic communities examined here to
determine the scope of First Amendment protection that speech
receives.19 Yet Part V also raises an important question created by this
OlUGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 2006).

14. Cf F.H. Buckley, Liberal Nationalism, 48 UCLA L. REV. 221, 247 (2000) ("[A]
particularist theory of rights need not claim that its stock of rights is appropriate in every state or
society and might defend a conception of rights for a particular polity only").
15. See infra text accompanying notes 23-35 (discussing the "average person" perspective
in the law of obscenity).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 23-57.
17. See infra notes 58-196 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 197-228.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 229-38.
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situation that both courts and legal scholars must address:
Is it better or worse for the law (in particular, U.S. constitutional
law) to engage in and to embrace a fictional, imagined community of
one-the hypothetical average viewer and reader-when determining
the scope of message protection, than it is for it to engage in a fractured,
fissured First Amendment jurisprudence, one replete with multiple
imagined communities of interpreters? 20
This Article standing alone cannot, of course, answer this question.
The current state of the law, as this Article demonstrates, employs both
types of communities when it seems appropriate or the interests of
justice, in judges' minds, apparently require it. But the question's
importance, in areas that stretch beyond the well-trod realm of critical
race theory and hate speech 2 1 in which the ethnicity of the audience
impacts the harm of words,2 2 is important for consideration, as courts
attempt to reconcile and balance the delicate dance of objectivity
suggested by a national constitutional standard with the subjectivity
inherent in a country that, by its very make-up (think an AfricanAmerican president and Latina Supreme Court Justice) cannot truly
capture all viewpoints in any one "average" person. Importantly, a
review of the legal literature drawn from law journal articles is
incorporated into each section, for purposes of flow and context, rather
than being set forth separately.
II. OF OBSCENITY LAW, AVERAGE VIEWERS, AND
DEVIANT COMMUNITIES:
WHEN THE GENERALIZED, AVERAGE AUDIENCE IS IRRELEVANT

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's current test for obscenity, the
sexual content in question in any given case is supposed to be
considered from the perspective of a hypothetical "average person"23
situated in the local community.2 4 What would, in other words, an

20. Under Anderson's analysis, a community is imagined to the extent that its members
"will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion." ANDERSON, supranote 13, at 6.
21. See generally J. Angelo Corlett & Robert Francescotti, Foundations of a Theory of
Hate Speech, 48 WAYNE L. REv. 1071 (2002) (attempting to explicate the concept of hate
speech and theory centering on its protection censorship).
22. See generally Richard Delgado, About Your Masthead:A PreliminaryInquiry into the
Compatibility of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(discussing hate speech, critical race theory and civil rights/civil liberties).
23. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 2-12 (discussing the concept of "community" in
obscenity law in the United States).
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average person think if he or she were the audience member viewing the
content?
The material at issue is not to be judged, as the high court has
unequivocally made clear, from the perspective of "the most prudish or
the most tolerant." 2 5 Such individuals, however, are to be included
within the community. 2 6 Jurors thus must "consider the entire
community and not simply their own subjective reactions, or the
reactions of a sensitive or of a callous minority." 27 Children, however,
are not to be included by jurors when considering the members of the
community.28 In summary, the average person represents an imagined
amalgam or somewhat surreal "synthesis of the entire adult
community. ,,29
A review of the official, standardized jury instructions from several
states illustrates just how all of this confusion is framed by judges for
layperson jurors. For example, California jury instruction CALJIC
16.184 provides:
The term "average adult person," as used in these instructions,
is a hypothetical composite person who typifies the entire
community including persons of both sexes; persons religious
and irreligious; persons of all nationalities, all adult ages and all
economic, educational and social standings; neither libertines nor
prudes, but persons with normal, healthy, average contemporary
attitudes, instincts and interests concerning sex.3 0
As the question framed in the Introduction of this Article suggests,3 1
is this deployment or operationalization of a supposedly objective
standard of an average person really any clearer than would be another
imagined standard of a smaller imagined community? Imagine, for a
moment, the average juror from your hometown considering what is
"libertine" and what is "prude" in an era in which people think of
25. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977).
26. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 300 (1978) ("The vice is in focusing upon
the most susceptible or sensitive members when judging the obscenity of materials, not in
including them along with all others in the community").
27. Smith, 431 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).
28. Pinkus, 436 U.S. at 298; see Cenite, supra note 3, at 35-36 (observing that "[t]he
Court has ruled children are not to be included in the community, though especially sensitive
adults could be considered, since a 'community includes all adults who constitute it, and a jury
can consider them all in determining relevant community standards,' as long as they were not
'focused upon"').
29. Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-CorePornography:A Proposalfor a PerSe Rule, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 255, 263 (1987-88).
30. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL

31. See supra text accompanying note 20.

§ 16.184 (2009).
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others' sexuality in terms like slutty and skanky.
In Massachusetts, Model Jury Instruction 7.180, which is used in
district courts in that state, governs the possession and distribution of
obscene matter. 32 It provides that jurors must consider the material in
question from the perspective of "an average adult person in this
county" 33 and admonishes them that:
your test is the attitudes and standards of an average adult citizen
of this county on the date of the alleged offense. You are not to
use the standards of a particularly sensitive or insensitive person.
Nor may you use your own personal attitudes and standards as
your test. You should use your knowledge of the views of
average citizens of this county in order to decide whether this
material appeals to the prurient interest of average adult citizens
of this county.3 4
The average person perspective, however, is more easily stated than
it is applied. As Judge Joseph T. Clark, of an Ohio state court, wrote in a
law review article, "how can the typical juror know what the average
person believes regarding obscene material, when the average person is
really a mythical person? The average person is one who possesses all
the demographic characteristics of the community." 35
But the law of obscenity actually includes a perspective-shifting
framework that is flexible and subjective enough to account for and
adapt to particular audiences and identities when determining message
protection. Specifically, the body of case law that has developed around
the Miller test includes a dichotomy between average adults and sexual
deviants.
In particular, if the sexual material under prosecution is designed or
targeted for a specific deviant group in society, then the jury must judge
it by whether it would appeal to the prurient interest of the average
member of that deviant group. 3 6 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in a
32. CRIMINAL MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE DISTRICT COURTS vol. 2, no.

7.180 (2009).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Joseph T. Clark, The "Community Standard" in the Trial of Obscenity Cases-A
Mandatefor Empirical Evidence in Search ofthe Truth, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 13, 17 (1993).
36. In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that:
[w]here the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly
defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal
requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that
group.
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Mishkin v. New York,38

"we adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by
permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of
the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient group." 39
The high court in Miller acknowledged the validity of this Mishkin
distinction, observing that:
the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of
"the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" is to be certain that, so far as material is not aimed at
a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average

person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive
person-or indeed a totally insensitive one.4 0
Why make this distinction? Because certain fetishes that the average
person simply would find revolting and repulsive (rather than appealing
to a prurient interest in sex, as is required by the first prong of Miller)
may actually be pruriently appealing and sexually arousing to a member
of the particular deviant group it targets. As Professor Mathias Reimann
concisely encapsulates it, "such material appeals to the prurientinterest
ofa few and is repulsive to the rest.'"1

The ramification, Reimann observes, is that "material can be, or
cannot be, obscene depending on who looks at it." 42 Mishkin muddles
Miller via its efforts to create and reconcile a relatively objective
obscenity jurisprudence-one that employs an average-person
standard-with the sexual interests of a non-geographic community of
so-called deviants. Reimann explains this judicial sleight of hand about
how to treat deviant-centric content under the first prong of Miller:
To condemn it under the prurient interest test, the test must be cut
in two halves. The appeal must be measured with reference to
one group, the few who experience it; the community standards
are determined in respect to the general populace that is left cold
by the material. The difficulties with this approach, having one
Id. at 508.
37. See James Peterson, Comment, Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law
Inhibits the Expression of Ideas About Sex and Gender, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 625, 647 (1998)
(observing that "the Supreme Court has not overruled Mishkin").
38. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
39. Id. at 509.
40. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (emphasis added).
41. Mathias Reimann, PrurientInterest and Human Dignity: PornographyRegulation in
West Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 201, 243 n.186 (1987-1988)
(emphasis added).
42. Id. at 228 n.125.
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sort of people determine what a quite different sort of people find
appealing, are obvious. The use of expert testimony at trial
represents an attempt to glue the two inconsistent pieces of the
test back together again.4
In a 2008 law journal article devoted to obscenity law and
community standards, Professor Bret Boyce neatly summarizes both the
Mishkin rule and the problems it creates for those who engage in sexual
practices that are shunned by the average-read, the majority-of
society: "it is obscene if it 'turns on' a 'deviant,' but 'grosses out' a
'normal' person. Obviously, such a test is a recipe for the repression of
sexual minorities.
How is this Mishkin determination implemented in practice? In
obscenity cases in California, standard jury instruction CALJIC 16.182
provides in relevant part:
The predominant appeal to prurient interest of the matter is
determined by reference to average adult persons unless it
appearsfrom the nature of the matter or the circumstances of its
dissemination, distribution or exhibition, that it is designedfor
clearly defined deviant sexual groups, in which cases the
predominant appeal of the matter shall be determined by
reference to its intended recipientgroup.4 5

Similarly, the pattern obscenity instruction for Massachusetts
explains to jurors that when the material "was designed for and
primarily disseminated to a clearly-defined deviant sexual group, rather
than the public at large, you are to consider whether the material as a
whole appealed to the prurient interest of members of that intended
group, ratherthan the average citizen of this county."46

Without a Mishkin instruction, then, some sexual content aimed at
deviant groups would never be deemed obscene under Miller because it
simply repulses the average person rather than appealing to his or her
prurient interests in sex. A real-life example is illustrative here.
Attorney James Peterson observed in a 1998 law journal article that
"[iln one notorious case, a charge of obscenity was successfully
defended on the grounds that a film showing oral sex performed on a
dog was too disgusting to appeal to the prurient interest of the average
43. Id. at 243 n.186.
44. Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 359
(2008).
45.

CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL

§ 16.182 (2009) (emphasis added).

46. CRIMINAL MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE DISTRICT COURTS vol. 2, no.

7.180 (2009).
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adult.' 47 Similarly, a federal judge in Georgia held that the movie
Caligula48 was not obscene because its "overwhelming depictions of
violence, cruelty and sexual behavior would inhibit rather than appeal to
a prurient interest in sex.'A9
The Mishkin instruction may receive increasin use in coming years,
as more niches of adult content are developed,s along with changing
mores and sexual values that may or may not hold some types of
content "deviant." For instance, in the 2008 trial in United States v.
Little,5 a Mishkin instruction was given by U.S. District Judge Susan
Bucklew after an expert witness, psychologist Michael P. Brannon,5 2
testified that the content at issue was directed at atypical deviant groupss
including "dominants/submissives and fans of urination,"53 "fisting"
47. James Peterson, Comment, Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law
Inhibits the Expression ofldeas About Sex and Gender, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 625, 647 (1998).
48. This is "a 1980 XXX-rated movie written and produced by Penthouse owner Bob
Guccione. . . ." FREDERICK S. LANE, III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF
PORNOGRAPHY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 36 n.14 (2000).
49. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Webb, 594 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
50. A review of the winners at the 2009 AVN Awards, the adult industry's equivalent of
the Academy Awards, reveals dozens of different categories of adult sexual content, with
awards given for things such as Best Spanking Release, Best Orgy/Gang Bang Release, Best
Transsexual Release, Best Foot/Leg Fetish Release, Best BD/SM Release and Best Squirting
Release. AVN, Awards Show, Past Winners from 2009, http://avnawards.avn.com/winners/
2009/ (last visited June 9, 2010).
51. No. 8:07-cr-00170-T-24-M55, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45639 (M.D. Fla. June 10,
2009). See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, The 2008 Federal Obscenity
Conviction of Paul Little and What It Reveals About Obscenity Law and Prosecutions, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543 (2009) (providing an analysis of the trial in United States v.
Little).
52. Brannon "is co-director of the Institute for Behavioral Sciences and the Law in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. He is a Florida licensed psychologist with specializations in clinical and
forensic psychology." Michael P. Brannon, Psy.D., Psychology Information Resource Center
website, http://psyris.com/michaelpbrannon (last visited June 9, 2010). Brannon "has handled
thousands of cases in a forensic capacity and has testified as an expert over 1000 times in
Federal and State Court Criminal and Civil Divisions throughout Florida. He regularly is
appointed as an expert by the judiciary and is often called upon as an expert witness or forensic
consultant to attorneys." Id.
53. See United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2005) (using the term
"urolagnia" to describe "the use of urine in sexual activities"); Richard A. Collacott & SallyAnn Cooper, Urine Fetish in a Man with LearningDisabilities, 39 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES.

145, 145-47 (1995) (describing urine fetishes as uncommon).
54. See generally Tristan Taormino, The Art of Anal Fisting, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 21,
2005, at 147 (providing that "[a]nal fisting, also known as handballing, is the gradual process of
putting your hand (and for very experienced players, sometimes your forearm) inside someone's
ass," contending that "[fjisting as a term is misleading since you don't go inside all at once like
a punch; usually your hand is not in a clenched fist once it is in there," and adding that "gay men
popularized fisting in the late '60s and '70s during the sexual revolution and founded private
fisting clubs in major urban areas"); Tristan Taormino, The Five-FingerClub, VILLAGE VOICE,
Apr. 18, 2000, at 172 (describing vaginal fisting as "penetration with your entire hand[,]" and
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and "vomiting."5 5 Similarly, there may be categories of content that are
tailored to the appetites of people with particular paraphilias.5 6
In summary, the law of obscenity engages in the process of shifting
audiences to determine message protection in two ways. The first, as
described in the Introduction, shifts the audience geographically, from
one local community to another, with each geographic community
holding its own perspective on whether or not sexual content is obscene.
The second, a decidedly non-geographic shift, moves the focus from
how an average person would view the material to how a deviant
person-in particular, one holding the same sexually deviant interests as
someone at which the content is aimed-would consider it. As the
Introduction contends, this fractured-audience approach removes any
notion of a uniform application of First Amendment standards in
obscenity cases. Uniform, at least to the extent that an average-person
viewpoint is used, akin to an objective, reasonable-person standard used
in negligence,5 7 but certainly not uniform geographically. It creates the
type of particularist rights5 that fragment the law and lead jurors to
guess whether or not something would, as it were, sexually arouse a
sexual deviant.
The next part of this Article illustrates another area, fighting
words-where the law employs a customized First Amendment
jurisprudence that tailors the scope of message protection, based upon
dueling assumptions of generalized norms that apply when the audience
or target of the speech is a hypothetical average person, and niche
norms used when the audience or target for speech holds unique
characteristics.
III. WHEN THE TARGET MAKES A DIFFERENCE IN FIGHTING WORDS:
THICK-SKINNED Cops, THIN-SKINNED TEACHERS & THE
AVERAGE PERSON

With apologies to Professor Alex B. Long, who recently wrote an
entire law journal article about what he contended were "the many uses
adding that "[w]hen one woman fists another, it is a defiant act-bold, outrageous, boundarybusting. Oh, and it feels great, too").
55. Mark Kernes, Closing Arguments In Max Trial Reveal Prosecution's True Agenda,
AVN, June 5, 2008, http://business.avn.com/articles/30592.html (last visited June 9, 2010).
56. See generally Bernard Gert, A Sex CausedInconsistency in DSM-III-R: The Definition
of Mental Disorderand the Definition of Paraphilias,17 J. MED. & PHIL. 155 (1992) (providing
an excellent overview of the meaning of paraphilias).
57. See DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 44 (2d ed. 2003) ("Generally,
in negligence law we employ an objective standard of care and use the hypothetical reasonable
person to breathe life into the concept for juries").
58. See Buckley, supra note 14, at 247 (describing particularist rights).
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and misuses of popular music lyrics in legal writing," 59 Tom Petty once
sang that "you need rhino skin if you're gonna pretend you're not hurt
by this world."60 The aging singer-songwriter's lyrical message about
people needing metaphorically thick skin to endure and survive the
verbal aspersions and abuse that may be heaped upon them actually
plays out rather inconsistently in the area of fighting words. In
particular, as this part demonstrates, the law of fighting words provides
varying standards in terms of just how many verbal slings and arrows a
person or category of person must suffer before First Amendment
protection for the speech in question evaporates. 6 1
A. Overview of the Fighting Words Doctrine

The U.S. Supreme Court gave birth to the fighting words doctrine
more than sixty-five years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,62 when
it unanimously opined that:
there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.63

To the extent that, as Dean Rodney Smolla of the Washington and Lee
University School of Law recently observed, this language from
"Chaplinsky is understood as standing for the proposition that speech
tending to incite an immediate breach of peace is not protected by the
First Amendment, it was and is an unremarkable opinion." 64 Indeed,
fighting words constitute one of the narrow categories of speech today
59. Alex B. Long, [Insert Song Lyrics Here]: The Uses and Misuses of PopularMusic
Lyrics in Legal Writing, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 531, 535 (2007).
60. ToM PET=Y, Rhino Skin, on EcHo (Warner Brothers 1999). The lyrics are available at
http://www.mp3lyrics.org/t/tom-petty/rhino-skin (last visited June 9, 2010).
61. This is a paraphrase of Hamlet's famed "to be, nor not to be" soliloquy, drawn from
the work of William Shakespeare, who, unlike Tom Petty, "has been cited or quoted by
American courts more often than any other literary figure." Steven M. Oxenhandler, The Lady
Doth Protest Too Much Methinks: The Use of FigurativeLanguagefrom Shakespeare'sHamlet
in American Case Law, 23 HAMLINE L. REv. 370, 371 (2000).
62. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1527, 1530 (1993) (writing that "the fighting words doctrine was first
formulated" in Chaplinsky).
63. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
64. Rodney A. Smolla, Words "Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury": The
Evolving Treatment of Inherently DangerousSpeech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP.
L. REv. 317, 318 (2009).
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that, like obscenity addressed in Part II, are not safeguarded by the First
Amendment. 6 5 The Supreme Court reinforced this point in 2003 in the
cross-burning case of Virginia v. Black,66 when it wrote that fighting
words "are generally proscribable under the First Amendment."67
The Black Court fleshed out the definition of fighting words from
Chaplinsky by quoting from its 1971 opinion in Cohen v. California,6 8
in which it described fighting words as "those personally abusive
epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." 69
Cohen, as Professor Donald Lively and his colleagues observe, thus
"narrowed the category of unprotected 'fighting words' to foreclose" 70 a
much more expansive interpretation of Chaplinsky that could possibly
punish "any words which others find provocative or offensive."71 In
fact, the Court since Chaplinsky has made it clear that the government
cannot generally suppress words simply because they might offend.7 2
The fighting words doctrine today, criticized by many legal scholars
for multiple reasons, 73 applies only "where both speaker and listener are
in close physical proximity. The speaker's words are so inappropnate
and offensive that they will likely prompt the hearer to retaliate by
committing an act of physical violence. . . ."74 To constitute fighting

words, the speech must be, as constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky
observed, "directed at a particular person."75
65. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) ("As a general
principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or speak
or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech,
including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.").
66. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
67. Id at 359.
68. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
69. Id at 20 (emphasis added); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting Cohen's
language).
70. DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT
PERSPECTIVES, AND DIALOGUES 105 (2003).

LAW:

CASES,

COMPARATIVE

71. Id.
72. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("[I]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
73. See, e.g., Burton Caine, The Trouble with "Fighting Words": Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire is a Threat to FirstAmendment Values and Should be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV.
441, 443-44 (2004) (blasting Chaplinksy as "a tragedy for the jurisprudence of Freedom of
Speech" because it "carve[d] out, in wholesale fashion, vast categories of exceptions to the First
Amendment's otherwise unqualified protection of speech" and because it created a category of
unprotected speech "so ill-conceived that not once in the ensuing sixty-two years has the United
States Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on it").
74. Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the FirstAmendment, 36 CONN.
L. REV. 541, 575 (2004).
75.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 817 (1st ed.
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The doctrine thus is premised, as Professor Charles Lawrence writes,
on the anticipation "that the verbal 'slap in the face' of insulting words
will provoke a violent response with a resulting breach of the peace."7 6
Put more bluntly by Kathleen Sullivan, former dean of Stanford Law
School, fi lting words constitute "a face-to-face provocation to a
."
brawl ...
For instance, when the U.S. Supreme Court protected Gregory Lee
Johnson's act of burning the American flag as a form of political
expression, it found that his symbolic speech7 8 did not amount to
fighting words.79 Writing the majority opinion in Texas v. Johnson, the
late Justice William Brennan reasoned that "no reasonable onlooker
would have regarded Johnson's generalized expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct
personalinsult or an invitation to exchangefisticuffs."80
B. Confronting Cops: A Thick-Skinned Community of
Message Recipients
Despite the Cohen Court's use of the phrase "ordinary citizen" 8'
when defining fighting words, the reality of this doctrine is that some
people-namely, police officers-must roll with the verbal punches and
not enter into the fisticuffs referred to by Justice Brennan in Johnson.
Several recent cases illustrate this point when it comes to heated words
directed at police officers, rather than at average citizens.
Consider, for example, the 2008 case of South Dakota v. Suhn.8 2 The
Supreme Court of South Dakota protected the speech of Marcus J.
Suhn, who had been "convicted of disorderly conduct for yelling
profanities at a passing police car in Brookings, South Dakota." 83 As the
local bars closed down in Brookings in the early morning hours of
September 2, 2007, and with about 100 people gathered along the
1997). Chemerinksy currently serves as founding dean of the University of California, Irvine
School of Law. See Rachel Zahorsky, Irvine by Erwin: Can a Top Legal Academic Create a
New Law School that is Both Innovative and Elite?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 46, 47 (describing
Chemerinsky's efforts to create "one of the most innovative law schools in the nation").
76. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 452 (1990).
77. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 40 (1992).
78. See generally James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to
Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2008) (providing a current and comprehensive review and analysis
of the symbolic speech doctrine).
79. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
82. 759 N.W.2d 546 (S.D. 2008).
83. Id. at 547.
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sidewalk on Main Avenue, 84 Suhn let loose a string of profanities that
would have made the late comedian Lenny Bruce proud. 5 Just like
police in comedy clubs in places like Los Angeles, Chicago, San
Francisco and New York arrested Bruce for his words,8 6 the police in
Brookings arrested Suhn after he yelled obscenities8 7 at two officers in a
patrol car with its windows rolled down.8 8
On appeal to the high court of South Dakota, Suhn asked it to
consider one issue: "whether the circuit court's application of the
disorderly conduct statute to Suhn's utterances amounted to an
abridgement of speech in violation of the First Amendment." 89 To
analyze that issue, the Suhn court applied the fighting words doctrine. 90
A four-judge majority concluded that Suhn's vituperations were
protected, reasoning that "as offensive or abusive as Suhn's invective to
the police may have been, 'when addressed to the ordinary citizen,'
Suhn's words were not 'inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction."'91 Il fact, however, a police officer is not treated as "the
ordinary citizen"92 when it comes to fighting words. She is treated, as
Tom Petty might put it, as having rhino skin.
The U.S. Supreme Court observed more than two decades ago in
City of Houston v. Hil9 4 that the fighting words exception to First
Amendment speech protection "might require a narrower application in
cases involving words addressed to a police officer." 95 Writing the
opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan boldly reasoned that "the freedom
of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without
thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we
distinguish a free nation from a police state." 96 He concluded the
opinion by enunciating what he called a "constitutional
requirement" 9 7-that "in the face of verbal challenges to police action,
officers and municipalities must respond with restraint." 98 The First
84. Id.
85. See generally EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLs LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE 444-79 (First

Vintage Books 1993) (1992) (providing a description of the multiple obscenity cases brought
against Lenny Bruce for his profanity-laced comedic routines).
86. Id.
87. Suhn, 759 N.W.2d at 547.
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Id. at 548-50.
91. Id. at 550 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
92. Id.
93. See PETTY, supra note 60.
94. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
95. Id. at 462.
96. Id. at 462-63.
97. Id. at 471.
98. Id.
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Amendment, Brennan opined, requires "that a certain amount of
expressive disorder not only is inevitable in a society committed to
individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would
survive." 99
Close observers of First Amendment jurisprudence will note that this
last statement tracks Justice Brennan's language two decades before in
the seminal libel case of New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan.'00 In Sullivan,
Brennan described "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 10
Sullivan created a dichotomized libel jurisprudence-one in which
speech targeting public officials receives more protection, via
application of the actual malice fault standard,10 2 than speech targeting
private people,103 a topic addressed in Part IV.
It is thus not surprising that Brennan would also agree that police
officers, as government officials, must take words like those of Marcus
Suhn even when they are not part of some lofty debate on public issues.
The other striking similarity here with Sullivan is Justice Brennan's
somewhat fatalistic feeling that certain types of offensive speech are
simply unavoidable and cannot-and should not-be stopped. For
example, contrast Brennan in Sullivan: "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate,"1 04 with Brennan in Hill: "a certain amount of

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 472.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 270.
The Court in Sullivan concluded that:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice "-that is, with knowledge that it wasfalse or with reckless disregardof
whether it was false or not.

Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added). See generally KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE
LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION: 2009 UPDATE 119-39 (7th ed. 2008) (providing an overview

of Sullivan, actual malice and public officials in defamation law).
103. The U.S. Supreme Court held in 1974 that "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). See generally ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW
OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION 124 (2d ed. 2009) (observing that "private figures

usually do not have to prove actual malice as the level of fault in their cases. Instead, they need
to show the libel defendant acted with negligence").
104. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
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expressive disorder . .. is inevitable in a society committed to individual
freedom." 0 5
The roots of Justice Brennan's 1987 opinion in Hill are planted in a
concurring opinion in the Supreme Court's ruling thirteen years before
in Lewis v. City of New Orleans.106 In that case, the Court declared
unconstitutional, on overbreadth10 7 grounds, a New Orleans's ordinance
that made it "unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person
wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language
toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the
actual performance of his duty."1 0 8 The Louisiana Supreme Court had
narrowly construed the meaning of the statute, holding that it applied
only "to 'fighting words' uttered to specific persons at a specific
time."1 09 The majority of the Supreme Court, however, found that the
statute still applied too broadly, sweeping up speech that is merely
"vulgar or offensive"' ' 0-speech previously found by the Court to be
protected in cases like Cohen v. California.
In his concurring opinion in Lewis, Justice Lewis Powell argued that
"a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected"1 12 to tolerate
more abusive language directed at him. In turn, society should expect a
police officer to be "less likely to respond belligerently to 'fighting
words."'ll 3 Drawing from both Hill and Lewis, the fighting words
doctrine does not apply equally or uniformly to all targets of speech.
Instead, it carves out a caveat or exception for police officers-at least
those who are "properly trained"' 4 -who must endure more abusive
and offensive speech before making an arrest.
Courts today continue to apply this police officer exception to the
fighting words doctrine.1 15 For instance, in September 2008 in People v.
105. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987).
106. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
107. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) ("The overbreadth
doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of
protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process").
108. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132 (quotation omitted).
109. Id. at 132 (quotation omitted); see City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450, 456
(La. 1972) (holding that the statute in question "is narrowed to 'fighting words' uttered to
specific persons at a specific time; it is not overbroad and is therefore not unconstitutional"),
rev'd, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
110. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 134.
111. 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (protecting the right of a person to wear a jacket
emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" in a public courthouse, and famously noting that
"while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most
others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
112. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
114. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
115. See, e.g., Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 776 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that "the First
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Brown,116 Judge Sandra A. Forster of the Supreme Court of New York,
Westchester County, held that the following speech, directed face-toface at a police officer, was protected speech under the First
Amendment: "Do you have a problem? You wouldn't be that tough
without a uniform and those guns, man you are lucky you're
working."ll7 In reaching her pro-speech conclusion in dismissing the
defendant's conviction on the charge of disorderly conduct,' 18 Judge
Forster reasoned that:
police officers are trained to deal with provocation from ordinary
people. The court must balance the freedom of speech with the
need to suppress aggressive behavior. The Supreme Court of the
United States reasoned the [sic] when an officer is properly
trained, he might reasonably be expected to constrain himself
more than the average citizen and that he would be less likely to
respond belligerently to "fighting words."ll 9
The protection of speech directed at police in 2008 in Brown mirrors
the ruling in a 1992 decision by the Criminal Court of the City of New
York in People v. Stephen.120 In Stephen, the defendant was arrested
and charged with disorderly conducted after "clutching his genital area
with his hands"'21 while yelling phrases such as "fuck you;" 22 "if you
were in jail, I'd fuck you, you'd be my bitch;" 2 3 "if you didn't have
that gun and badge, I'd kick your ass, I'd kill you;"' 24 and "yeah, fuck
the police." 2 5
Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Hill, the court observed that
"the fighting words' doctrine applies more narrowly to police officers,
as police officers are trained and expected to exercise more restraint in
response to provocation than do other citizens." 26 Applying that rule to
the facts in Stephen, the New York court held that the abusive language
Amendment protects even profanity-laden speech directed at police officers[,]" and noting that
"[p]olice officers reasonably may be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the
average citizen and should be less likely to be provoked into misbehavior by such speech");
Corey v. Nassan, No. 05-114, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68521, at **38-39 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25,
2006) (describing "[t]he enhanced protection of verbal criticism directed toward the police").
116. No. 07070449, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6160 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2008).
117. Id. at *2 (quotation omitted).
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id. at *3-4.
120. 581 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
121. Id. at 982.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id. at 983.
126. Id. at 985.

458

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

set forth above in bullet points--cursing an NYPD blue streak1 2 7 along
with the crotch-grabbing antics, did not amount to fighting words,
[I]n the context within which these words were uttered,
defendant's remarks, even with the accompanying gestures, could
not be said to have a direct tendency to provoke the police officer
to retaliate with acts of violence or other breach of the peace. No
reasonable person witnessing the situation would have thought it
likely that the police officer would have been driven to attack
defendant as a direct consequence of his comments. 12 8
The Stephen court thus concluded that "even if reasonable civilians
might have been provoked into retaliatory action by defendant's
comments,
one could expect that a trained police officer would remain
29

calm."1

Other courts in recent years are in accord, noting, as a Pennsylvania
court did, that "[tihe police must expect that, as part of their jobs, they
will be exposed to daily contact with distraught individuals in
emotionally charged situations." 30 For instance, a federal court in New
Mexico held in 2006 that "the phrase 'fuck you' by itself does not rise
to fighting words when directed at a police officer, even in a crowded
mall."l 3 1 The district court noted that "a police officer is expected to
exercise a higher degree of restraint than an average citizen whether the
speaker is aware that the speech is directed to a police officer or not." 32
A federal court in Kansas similarly protected the right of a person to
give the middle fingerl 33 to a police officer, reasoning that "the First
Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge directed at police officers, and this freedom is one of the
principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a
police state."l 34
127. Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 892 (2007)
(describing the colloquialism "he talks a blue streak").
128. Stephen, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
129. Id. at 986. It should be understood that the use of the word "fuck," standing alone and
"without more-isn't fighting words." Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDozo L. REV.
1711, 1736 (2007).
130. Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 947 (Pa. 1999).
131. Stone v. Juarez, No. CIV 05-508 JB/RLP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27272, at *35
(D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2006).
132. Id. at *36.
133. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Fingerand the Law, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1403 (2008) (providing a current and comprehensive analysis of the law
relating to the symbolic-speech gesture of raising the middle finger to convey a message).
134. Cook v. Bd. County Comm'rs, 966 F. Supp. 1049, 1051 (D. Kan. 1997). The right to
give the middle finger to police is generally protected by courts. See Corey v. Nassan, No. 05114, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68521, at *23, *36 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2006) (noting that "[s]everal
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As the title of this Article suggests, a shift in the intended audience
of speech-in other words, a shift in the target at whom speech is
directed-will affect the extent of protection that speech receives, at
least within the framework of the fighting words doctrine as it has
evolved since Chaplinsky. Placed in the context of a simple "if-then"
formula: If the audience or target of the speech is the average citizen,
then the speech receives less protection than if the target is the police.
Parsed more bluntly, one can get away with more invective and
vitriolic speech if it is directed at a cop rather than the average person.
Of course, in reality, all cops are not alike; some police officers are
more sensitive than others to criticism that might arise in a fighting
words scenario. Nonetheless, courts engage in a legal fiction-just like
they engage in a legal fiction when they ask jurors to conjure up an
average-person standard when they treat all police officers alike in this
area of First Amendment jurisprudence because of their occupation.
There are, of course, limits on how much an officer must take, with
some speech, indeed, crossin the line from protected offensiveness into
unprotected fighting words. 3 For example the Supreme Court of
Montana drew the line in State v. Robinson 6 when a man, while in a
crosswalk with other pedestrians, "glared"1 3 7 and used a "loud voice" 1 38
to call a police officer in a patrol car stopped at the traffic light a

courts have found that the use of the middle finger toward a police officer is protected speech,"
and adding that "[t]he weight of federal authority establishes that directing the middle finger at a
police officer is protected expression under the First Amendment absent some particularized
showing that the gesture in the specific factual context constitutes 'fighting words' or is
otherwise illegal").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, No. 2:06CR30, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83211, at
**18-24 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 8, 2007) (considering whether there is "a First Amendment right to
confront police officers in the routine performance of their duties with epithets such as 'f***
dickhead' and 'f***ing assholes' in an attempt to incite an intoxicated crowd to retaliation," and
holding there was no First Amendment violation when the speaker was arrested for such speech
under a statute prohibiting the use of profane or indecent language on a public highway that the
court had narrowly construed to reach only those words used in a fighting words situation);
Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F. Supp. 2d 835, 841, 849 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding "no First
Amendment violation" in the arrest of man who yelled at a police officer, who was asking him
questions, that "he was going to fuck somebody up"); L.J.M. v. State, 541 So. 2d 1321, 1322-23
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that shouting at a police officer in a loud voice, the phrase
"[m]an, you pussy-assed mother fucker" was not protected speech, as these "were words that by
their utterance tended to incite an immediate breach of peace and were 'fighting words."' The
Florida court seemed particularly disturbed by the moral offense of yelling at the police officer,
opining that "[i]f this country is to preserve in its citizens any sense of discipline and respect for
others in our society, the First Amendment simply cannot be construed to condone this type of
conduct").
136. 82 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2003).
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id.
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"fucking pig."139 The officer then pulled over, parked his car and
reportedly asked the man, Malachi Cody Robinson, "if there was
anything he wanted to talk about." 4 0 Robinson retorted "fuck off,
asshole,"l 4 1 at which time he was arrested for disorderly conduct. 4 2 In
holding that Robinson's speech constituted fighting words not protected
by the First Amendment, the Montana high court reasoned that "it is one
thing to expect peace officers to exercise more restraint than the average
citizen. However, it is quite another to allow the likes of Malachi
Robinson to gratuitously test that restraint without fear of being charged
with disorderly conduct." 43
Importantly, and in stark contrast to the approach taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the other courts described in this section, the
Montana Supreme Court questioned the very notion that there should be
two different standards for fighting words-one when the target of the
speech is the average citizen and one when the target is a police officer.
The court wrote:
We fail to see the logic in concluding that words (such as
"f****** pig") may or may not be deemed "fighting words"
depending upon the intended recipient. If the object is a fellow
citizen, they are considered fighting words. If, on the other hand,
the object is a police officer, who, if well-trained to exercise
restraint, will be less likely to respond belligerently, the words
are somehow less provocative. 144
A review of the legal literature reveals criticism of the Robinson
opinion by attorney Thomas W. Korver, 14 5 who points out that it "fails
to recognize inherent distinctions between the effect derogatory remarks
will have when spoken to the general public versus those same words
when spoken to a police officer."l 46 In brief, Korver points out that the
Montana Supreme Court failed to apply U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
as it "ignored the principle holding in Hill."l 4 7
139. Id.
140. Id. at 28-29.
141. Id. at 29.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id.
145. Korver, the former editor-in-chief of the Montana Law Review, is an associate with
Porzak Browning & Bushong LLP in Boulder, Colorado. See Thomas W. Korver, Porzak
Browning & Bushong LLP website, http://www.pbblaw.com/thomaskorver.html (last visited
June 9, 2010).
146. Thomas W. Korver, Note, State v. Robinson: Free Speech, or Itchin 'for a Fight?, 65
MONT. L. REv. 385, 403 (2004).
147. Id. at 404.
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Suggesting that the skin of police officers must be even thicker now
then when the fighting words doctrine was created in Chaplinsky, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 2002 noted in Greene v.
Barberl4 8 that "standards of decorum have changed dramatically since
1942, moreover, and indelicacy no longer places speech beyond the
protection of the First Amendment." 4 9 In Greene, an attorney called a
police officer an "asshole"o5 0 during a face-to-face argument in the
lobby of the hall of justice building in Grand Rapids, Michigan. 15 1 The
attorney's voice reportedly "was loud enough to attract the attention of
other people in the lobby," 5 2 or, as the appellate court put it rather
wryly, "it is fair to conclude that Mr. Greene was not speaking sotto
voce. "153 In holding that Greene was within his First Amendment rights
to utter the aspersion, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that "it is hard to
imagine Mr. Greene's words inciting a breach of the peace by a police
officer whose sworn duty it was to uphold the law."' 54
There is, however, an important caveat here to the two-level fighting
words approach that requires police to tolerate more speech than the
average citizen. In particular, it is clear that an officer can squelch the
speech of a person who repeatedly interrupts the officer so as to impede
his or her ability to carry out an investigation and job duties, even if that
speech does not rise to the level of fighting words. This is illustrated in
a July 2008 ruling by U.S. District Judge John W. Lungstrum in
McCormick v. City of Lawrence.'5 5 The case involved the speech of "a
self-proclaimed civil rights activist" 56 that interfered with the work of
two officers who were at a crime scene investigating a carjacking.157 As
described by Judge Lungstrum, Dale McCormick:
[B]egan badgering the officers in a constant, loud, and disruptive
manner that clearly was intended to disrupt their efforts to
investigate the crime at hand. In fact, plaintiffs conduct was so
distracting that one officer at the scene-defendant Harvey-had
to devote his time solely to keeping plaintiff away from Officer

310 F.3d 889 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 896.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id. at 893 (quotation omitted).
Id. "Sotto voce" means to speak "under the breath" or "in a private manner."
available at
http://www.merriamONLINE
DICTIONARY,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
webster.com/dictionary/sotto+voce (last visited June 9, 2010).
154. Greene, 310 F.3d at 896.
155. No. 02-2135, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60367 (D. Kan. July 18, 2008).
156. Id. at*1.
157. See id. at *12-14 (describing the verbal altercation with the officers).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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Stegall so that Officer Stegall could investigate the carjacking
incident. 5 8
Judge Lungstrum thus concluded that McCormick's "speech during this
encounter, by virtue of its time and manner, plainly obstructed ongoing
police activitV involving a third party. As such, it is not constitutionally
McCormick actually seems to be a pivotal player in
protected."1
creating this body of police-targeted, fighting words jurisprudence, as
he previously had run afoul of the law in several other incidents when
he yelled at police.1 6 0
The exception identified by Judge Lungstrum is rooted in the
concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Hill,' where Powell wroteperhaps in a move to temper his concurring position in Lewis thirteen
years before that police must tolerate more speech than average citizens
in fighting words scenarios 62-that:
I have no doubt that a municipality constitutionally may punish
an individual who chooses to stand near a police officer and
persistently attempt to engage the officer in conversation while
the officer is directing traffic at a busy intersection. Similarly, an
individual, by contentious and abusive speech, could interrupt an
officer's investigation of possible criminal conduct. A person
observing an officer pursuing a person suspected of a felony
could run beside him in a public street shouting at the officer.
Similar tactics could interrupt a policeman lawfully attempting to
interrogate persons believed to be witnesses to a crime.' 6 3

158. Id. at *12-13.
159. Id. at *14.
160. See, e.g., McCormick v. City of Lawrence, No. 03-2418-KHV, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5725, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2006) (involving an August 2001 incident at a sobriety
checkpoint in which McCormick "protest[ed] the checkpoint. Plaintiffs protest took the form
[sic] a verbal tirade which was primarily directed at the officers, calling them 'gestapo' and
'jack booted thugs.' As plaintiff protested, many of the bystanders laughed at the spectacle");
McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1197, 1200 (D. Kan. 2004) (involving
two incidents from 2002, including one deemed by the court to have crossed the line into
unprotected fighting words, as McCormick allegedly yelled at an officer, who was engaged in
the traffic stop of a third party, "'Mother F *** ers,' 'F*** heads,' 'F *** ing pigs,' 'Why don't
you run around the track, chubby?,' 'Hey chubby, what's your name?,' 'Hey fatty,' 'Hey fat
a**,' and 'Leave her the f*** alone"'), affd, 130 Fed. Appx. 987 (10th Cir. 2005).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99 (describing Hill).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14 (describing Justice Powell's concurrence
in Lewis).
163. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 479 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
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C. Confronting PublicSchool Teachers and Principals:ThinSkin Censorship
While an on-duty officer must have thicker skin than the "average
person" 64 under the fighting words doctrine, other government
employees in positions of power and authority who also are on duty are
treated as if they were eggshells ready to crack at any derogatory
comment directed to them. Who are they? Public school teachers.
Speech by minors directed at them, at least while on campus, can be
squelched before it ever even escalates to the cusp of a true fighting
words scenario that an average person might face.16
In a 1986 article in the Yale Law Journal, Professor Betsy Levin
observed that the enforcement of "institutional rules and regulations
may be as important to the socialization of students as the formal
curriculum."l 66 In particular, she contended that school rules that
prohibit "talking back to teachers" 67 and others like it that are
"concerned with certain patterns of behavior on the part of both students
and teachers" 68 are important because they "clearly inculcate particular
values, as do the procedures for determining whether those rules have
been violated and what sanctions should be imposed." 69
The same year that Levin published her article, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down its student-speech ruling in Bethel School Districtv.
Fraser.'7 0 The Fraser court upheld the punishment of a high school
student for engaging in "offensively lewd and indecent speech"' 7 ' that
was, in the majority's opinion, "unrelated to any political viewpoint," 72
despite the fact that it took the form of "a speech nominating a fellow
student for student elective office." 73

164. See Knight Riders of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir.
1995) ("Fighting words is a small class of expressive conduct that is likely to provoke the
averagepersonto retaliate, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." (emphasis added)).
165. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has never even needed to consider the fighting words
doctrine in the context of censoring student speech in public schools. See Christi Cassel, Note,
Keep Out of Myspace!: ProtectingStudents from UnconstitutionalSuspensions and Expulsions,
49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 643, 657 (2007) (writing that "the Supreme Court has not evaluated
the applicability of the 'true threat' and 'fighting words' doctrines in the realm of school
discipline").
166. Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
IndividualRights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1668 (1986).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
171. Id. at 685.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 677.
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In reaching this pro-censorship conclusion, the FraserCourt began
by asserting that "[t]he role and purpose of the American public school
system"l74 encompasses "inculcat[ing] the habits and manners of
civility as values in themselves." 7 5
It emphasized that:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers-and
indeed the older students-demonstrate the appropriate form of
civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and
u
i
b
deportment 176 in and out of class.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger emphasized
the power of schools to teach "essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct"l 78 as part of their educational mission. He added that "[t]he
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior." 179 Burger also noted that schools have the power
to restrict the "manner of speech." 8 0
Thus, if a student, using a loud voice, tells a teacher to "fuck off"'
while walking through a school hallway, the school could punish the
student before the speech escalated to the level of fighting words simply
because: 1) the speech is sexually lewd and offensive; 2) the manner of
speech is not a form of "civil, mature conduct" or "socially appropriate
behavior"; and 3) to punish such speech is to illustrate and to teach that
it contradicts the "habits and manners of civility" that schools must
teach. Conversely, a failure to punish the student's speech in this
example conveys the message to students that it is appropriate (or at
least tolerated) as a mode of expression in a civilized society. Tolerance
of rude and confrontational speech, in other words, undermines the
174. Id. at 681.
175. Id.
176. Talking back to teachers and principals would fall under what the U.S. Supreme Court
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), also
called "deportment." Id. at 508. This was something the Tinker court made clear it did not have
to address in that seminal decision. See id. at 507-08 ("The problem posed by the present case
does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or
deportment.").
177. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.
178. Id
179. Id. at 681.
180. Id. at 683.
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authority of teachers to convey the messages and lessons of civility that
are part of the pedagogical process privileged in Fraser.
Note that reasons two and three above still hold true even if the
language used by the student is not sexually offensive, but involves
calling the teacher a "fat, ugly, stupid moron." In both cases, it is the
uncivil manner of expression-an affront to authority-that is so
discordant with the educational mission of teaching socially appropriate
behavior.
All of this makes complete sense, given the majority's big-picture
observations in Fraser that "the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings."' 8 1 This point was reinforced in 2007 in the high
court's latest student-speech case of Morse v. Frederick.' 82 In the
opinion, Fraser was quoted approvingly by Chief Justice John
Roberts to make the point that if the student in Fraserhad "delivered
the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would
have been protected." 4
In summary, then, an on-campus teacher does not have to tolerate
"fuck you" and otherwise defiant speech before it becomes fighting
words, but an on-beat police officer often does have to tolerate it, even
beyond the usual fighting words.185 The speech directed at the teacher
can be stopped before it ever rises to the level of unprotected fighting
words, while the speech directed at the police officer actually can
exceed the level of fighting words that an average person must endure.
Put more bluntl, you cannot disrespect a teacher1 8 6 but you can
disrespect a cop.
181. Id. at 682.
182. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
183. Id at 404-05.
184. Id. at 405.
185. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987) ("The freedom of individuals verbally
to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principle
characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state."); W.L. v. State, 769
So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that hurling profane and offensive
language at a police officer is protected by the First Amendment); City of West Monroe v. Cox,
511 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that defendants' obscenities did not
amount to disturbing the peace because trained police officers are held to higher degrees of
restraint than average citizens).
186. A minor can, of course, disrespect the teacher if the minor is off campus. See Klein v.
Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1141-42 (D. Me. 1986) (protecting the right of a student to give the
middle-finger salute to a teacher while off campus).
187. The former part of this statement now makes its way into schools' codes of conduct.
For instance, the code of conduct of the Ozark City School System in southeast Alabama makes
it clear that the school system can suspend a student for "[d]efiance and/or disrespect of school
Board employee's authority." Ozark City Schools K-12 Code Of Student Conduct, available at
http://www.ozarkcityschools.net/public/ParentsStudents/CodeofConduct/tabid/66/Default.aspx
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What emerges, then, is not simply a two-tiered approach to fighting
words, but a tri-level one in which the shift in the audience or target of
the speech leads to different levels of speech protection.
Audience/Target of Speech
1. COPS
2. AVERAGE CITIZENS
3. TEACHERS

Level of Speech Protection in
Confrontations
Heightened
Average
Reduced

However, there are two particular problems with this approach. The
first is that some high school principals and teachers probably do have
thick enough skin to take some of the same abuse heaped on police
officers. As one federal judge wrote, in an off-campus speech case
involving a minor who gave the middle-finger gesture to one of his
teachers, giving "'the finger,' at least when used against a universe of
teachers, is not likely to provoke a violent response.""' Referring to the
other teachers and administrators in the same school, the judge added
that "the court cannot do these sixty-two mature and responsible
professionals the disservice of believing that collectively their
professional integrity, personal mental resolve, and individual character
are going to dissolve, willy-nilly, in the face of the digital posturing of
this splenetic, bad-mannered little boy." 189
As holds true with the discussion of police officers, 90 all teachers
are not actually alike, and some probably would brush off the speech in
question without either fighting back or even punishing the studentspeaker. It is a judicial fiction, then, to treat all principals and teachers
alike. It is simply the nature of their jobs-in this case, as government
employees taught to instill in today's youth certain values, manners and
a sense of civility in discourse and conduct-that mandates their
treatment as thin-skinned individuals who can censor speech before it
rises to the level of fighting words. When it comes to the police, it too is
the nature of their jobs-as government employees trained to exercise
(last visited June 9, 2010); see also Virginia Beach City Public Schools Code of Student
Conduct 2009-2010 School Year, available at http://www.vbschools.com/students/conduct/
code.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) ("A student will behave in a respectful manner toward
teachers/staff and other students. Examples of disrespectful behavior are: walking away, talking
back, refusing to identify self properly, rude behavior, spitting, and challenging authority."
(emphasis added)).
188. Klein, 635 F. Supp. at 1441 n.3.
189. Id. at 1441 n.4.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 81-163.
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restraint and to keep the peace, rather than disturb it-that requires they
be treated as having far thicker skin than the average person.
The second problem is that in being able to quickly squelch any
verbal challenge to their authority or show of verbal disrespect, teachers
and principals are presenting students with an inaccurate view about the
ability of citizens to verbally challenge government authorities in the
real world, be it police on the beat or members of Congress at town hall
meetings, as transpired in August 2009.191 Unless teachers take the time
to explain to their students that it is, in fact, permissible to talk back to
police and politicians, the lesson some students may learn is that they
never can challenge, via the spoken word and in a face-to-face situation,
certain government officials.
Finally, a close review of the case law reveals there is one seemingly
exceptional case when it comes to teachers. It is found in an Arizona
appellate court ruling called In re Louise.1 92 The appellate court held
that the speech of a high school student, directed in a face-to-face
setting at her assistant principal, did not amount to fighting words.193
The student, who was "visibly distraught,"l 94 used the phrases "[f]uck
this. I don't have to take this shit"l 95 and "[fluck you. I don't have to do
what you tell me." 96 The appellate court held that the student's "speech
cannot reasonably be said to amount to 'fighting words.' The speech
was not likely to provoke an ordinary citizen to a violent reaction, and it
was less likely to provoke such a response from a school official, the

alleged victim in this case." 97 The italicized part above indicates that
the court believed school officials are similar to police officers, in that
they are expected to bear the burden of more invectives than the average
citizen.
In summary, fighting words jurisprudence, just like that of obscenity,
employs an audience-shifting perspective in order to determine the
scope of message protection. Like obscenity, it too uses a fictional
average-person standard to bring a certain sense of uniformity, but then
carves out exceptions when the speech is intended for or directed at
niche audiences (cops and teachers in fighting words, and sexual
deviants in obscenity). The next part of this Article turns to another area
191. See generally Roger Simon, CallingAll Crazies-ObamaNeeds You, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2009, at A26 (describing "what is happening at the town hall meetings being held by
members of Congress this summer: yelling, screaming, the waving of arms and the gnashing of
teeth").
192. 3 P.3d 1004 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
193. Id. at 1005 (concluding that the student's "outburst involved neither 'fighting words'
nor 'seriously disruptive behavior"').
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1006 (emphasis added).
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of law-defamation-where the same audience-shifting principles
apply.

IV.

SHIFTING THE AUDIENCE TO DETERMINE MESSAGE PROTECTION
IN DEFAMATION:
AVERAGE READERS V. NICHE AUDIENCES

Since its 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 8 the
U.S. Supreme Court has taken libel law down a road of
constitutionalization that makes fundamental distinctions between, on
the one hand, public-official and public-figure plaintiffs and, on the
other, private plaintiffs. Depending upon characteristics such as the
plaintiffs occupation, level of celebrity or involvement on a particular
issue, different fault standards are employed to make it harder for public
plaintiffs to prevail than for private individuals. All of this is, as a
review of the literature reveals, well-covered territory in both media law
textbooks1 99 and law journals.2 0 0
This Article, however, explores the very different and underaddressed issue of how shifting audiences in libel law determine
whether the message in question actually is defamatory. As with both
obscenity and fighting words, the law of libel generally attempts to use
198. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
199. See, e.g., MIDDLETON & LEE, supra note 102, at 119-45 (addressing Sullivan, the
actual malice and negligence fault standards and the different categories of plaintiffs in
defamation law); WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 137-51 (rev. ed. 2008)

(addressing Sullivan, the actual malice and negligence fault standards and the different
categories of plaintiffs in defamation law); PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA

114-32, 148-54 (1st ed. 2002) (discussing Sullivan, the actual malice and negligence fault
standards and the different categories of plaintiffs in defamation law); JOHN D. ZELEZNY,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 130-44 (5th ed.

2007) (providing an overview of both shifting fault standards and categorizing plaintiffs in
defamation law).
200. See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First
Amendment Defamation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 81 (2005-2006) (analyzing the publicfigure versus private-figure dichotomy in defamation law); W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary
Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2003) (providing an
excellent overview and analysis of the various categories of "public" plaintiffs in defamation
Law); Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward
Fashioning Order From Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 91 (1987)
(addressing the concepts of actual malice, public figures and private figures in defamation law);
Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 449 (1984) (addressing the critical differences between the fault standards of
negligence and actual malice in defamation law); Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps,
and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J.
1519 (1987) (providing an excellent analysis of the public-figure and private-figure distinctions
in defamation law).
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an average-person standard when considering the meaning of a
message,2 1 but it too switches audience perspectives in some situations.
Just as certain fetishes can take on a different meaning for a sexual
deviant under Mishkin in obscenity, 202 so too can words take on
different meanings for particular imagined communities of people in
defamation law. In brief, shifting the audience can shift the meaning,
thereby affecting whether the speech at issue can be civilly punished via
libel law.
Professor C. Thomas Dienes and media defense attorney Lee Levine
point out "the ambiguity of meaning and the differing perceptions of
readers, viewers and listeners. Words can have different meanings in
distinct contexts, and the perceived meaning can vary for different
people." 2 03 These meanings are influenced by a community's values,
with those values sometimes shared by members of the community. As
Stanford University Professor Marc Franklin observed some twenty-five
years ago:
The determination of the type of statements that lower an
individual's reputation or expose him to hatred, contempt, and
ridicule raise important questions about societal values. Thus,
although it was unclear in the 1930s and late 1940s whether
attacking someone as a communist damaged his reputation, such
a statement was clearly defamatory during the Soviet Union's
alliance with Nazi Germany and later during the Cold War
204
years.
A case on point is MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., Inc.,2 05 in
which the Supreme Court of California in 1959 observed that "it is now
settled that a charge of membership in the Communist Party or
communist affiliation or sympathy is libelous on its face." 206 Today,
however, courts have held that falsely labeling someone a communist

201. See, e.g., James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 837-38 (N.Y. 1976) (observing that
the meaning of allegedly defamatory statements must be determined by "the sense in which the
words were likely to be understood by the ordinary and average reader" (emphasis added)
(quotation omitted)).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 36-56 (describing the rule from Mishkin and how
it applied via standardized jury instructions in California and Massachusetts).
203. C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of
Mind: The Promise ofNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IowA L. REv. 237, 237 (1993).
204. Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiffs Burden in Defamation:
Awareness andFalsity,25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 828 n.14 (1983-84) (emphasis added).
205. 343 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1959).
206. Id. at 41.
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just doesn't carry with it the same sting or harm, and thus it is not

necessarily defamatory. 20 7
One century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Peck v. Tribune
Co. 2 0 8 that the question of reputational harm in libel law centers on
whether the speech "would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an
important and respectable part of the community."209 This language
assumes that there is a single community-"the community." 21 0 Indeed,
as another court noted, "it is not one's reputation in a limited community
in which attitudes and social values may depart substantially from those
prevailin generally which an action for defamation is designed to
The law of libel thus typically considers how "the average
protect.
212
reader" would feel about a statement.
But what if the allegedly defamatory statement is only
communicated to a limited or micro-community---one united by
ethnicity or other characteristics such as interests or beliefs or, to
borrow Anderson's phrase, an "imagined community" 213 in the eyes of
the law? The question is pivotal because, as Professor Robert Post
observed, the central questions of meaning and reputational harm focus
on "which communities the law will assist in the maintenance of their
cultural identity." 2 14 Should there then be different communities of
interpreters-social deviants for instance, to draw a parallel with micro207. See Lasky v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 934, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reasoning
that "accusing another of being a communist is not libel when it occurs in the midst of public
debate in which voices are expected to be raised in sloganeering invective[,]" and finding that
"[s]uch name calling, in the context of public debate, is protected speech" (emphasis added);
Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th 832, 849 (Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that "[c]harges of
communism are part of the heat of the political kitchen"); Jaliman v. Selendy, No. 12820/04,
slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2005) (observing that "it is not a crime to be a member of
the communist party. Courts have held that accusations of communist affiliations do not
constitute slander per se as injurious to a business, trade or profession").
208. 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 190.
210. Id.
211. Saunders v. Bd. Directors WHYY-TV, 382 A.2d 257, 259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978)
(emphasis added).
212. See Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that
"[t]o discern whether a statement has a defamatory meaning, we interpret it from the standpoint
of the average reader" (emphasis added)); Sarkisian v. Rooke, No. 06-CV-00170, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26164, *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2007) ("To determine whether a statement is
defamatory, a court must consider its effect on the average reader or listener" (emphasis
added)); Seymour v. Lakeville Journal Co., No. 04 CV4532 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24897, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2004) (observing that the allegedly defamatory statements "are
not to be examined in isolation, but rather are to be considered in context and read as a whole as
the averagereaderwould peruse the article" (emphasis added)).
213. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 13.

214. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 715 (1986).
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communities of sexual deviants embraced by Mishkin in obscenity
law215 -when it comes to the scope of protection for a possibly
defamatory message?
This, in fact, is where defamation law takes account of shifting
audiences to determine the scope of message protection. Several very
recent cases illustrate this notion, as it plays out in a country that is
becoming increasingly diverse to the point that, within any single
geographic community, there are often many micro-communities with
different values that in terms of population size alone, may or may not
constitute "an important and respectablepart of the community"2 6 or,
similarly, "a considerable and respectable segment of the
community."217

In a 2008 case, the Court of Appeals of Georgia observed that a
publication that is claimed to be defamatory must be "construed in the
sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily
understand it." 218 This statement suggests that speech directed at a
specific, targeted audience of addressees should be evaluated by that
same micro-community and not by everyone in the larger geographic
community. A very recent opinion illustrates this point.
In February 2009, a California appellate court ruled in the libel case
of Nguyen-Lam v. Cao.m9 In Cao, the plaintiff, who had just been
selected for the position of superintendent of the Westminster School
District in southern California, was called a Communist by the
220
defendant.
Subsequent to this statement, the school board met again,
reconsidered its initial decision and then voted to terminate the plaintiff
as superintendent. 22 1 The plaintiff, who otherwise would have "become
the first Vietnamese person hired in America as a superintendent of a
public school system," 222 sued the person who called her a Communist,
asserting that "calling someone a 'Communist' in Westminster's 'Little
Saigon' Vietnamese community was 'extremely harmful to [her]
215. See id. at 735-38 (discussing how defamation law sustains rules of civility within
communities, and asserting that "[t]he essence of tolerance is the refusal to draw boundaries that
shut out the deviant. But while this refusal may be justified by respect for the individuality of
the deviant and by the need for different social groups to live together in a land as diverse as the
United States, it can nevertheless be deeply antithetical to the constitution of community
identity").
216. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (emphasis added).
217. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 127 (1st Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
218. Lucas v. Cranshaw, 659 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). This
language was quoted approvingly in July 2009 in Community Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King,
682 S.E.2d 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
219. 171 Cal. App. 4th 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
220. Id. at 863-64.
221. Id. at 864.
222. Id. at 863.
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reputation.' While the statements were not made to Vietnamese
individuals, they were made to Board members necessarily attuned by
demographics to the concerns of Vietnamese-American voters." 223
Importantly, the defendant had not made the statement to the
community at large, but had communicated it during a phone call to the
school board president and another school board member. 2 24 The
appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and upheld the trial court's
denial of the defendant's motion to strike the libel cause of action. 2 25
Cao thus illustrates how libel law's use of a micro-community to
determine meaning-in this case, those intimately familiar with and
immersed in the 'Little Saigon' Vietnamese community2-affects the
extent of protection the speech in question will receive. Importantly, a
micro-community is not just a limited geographic community like
'Little Saigon'; 22 eographically diffuse communities have spawned
similar lawsuits. While it may be defamatory to falsely call a refugee
of Vietnamese origin a Communist within these micro-communities, it
may not be defamatory to call the average person in the greater Los
Angeles area (encompassing 'Little Saigon') a Communist (the very
notion of an average-Angelino-reader perspective seems ridiculous if
one recognizes the multiple enclaves of communities within its
boundaries, from sexual ones like the gay community in West
Hollywood, to racial ones like the black community in Compton).
Technology suggests that situations like Cao will arise increasingly
in the future. The Internet provides social networking sites that allow
smaller micro-communities to bond, connect and direct messages
specifically intended for other members of those communities (and,
conversely, not intended for general communities that may be reached
by older media, such as general circulation newspapers and network
television). Libel law's recognition, described in this part of the Article,
that a message should be "construed in the sense in which the readers to
whom it is addressedwould ordinarily understand it" 22 8 may get quite a
223. Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 865.
225. Id. at 874.
226. This area has been described in the news media as a "staunchly anti-communist
Vietnamese enclave in central Orange County, where the flag of fallen South Vietnam continues
to wave, business owners, politicians and even pop singers know the [communist] label can
spark street protests and damaging reports in the Vietnamese press." My-Thuan Tran,
RedbaitingGoes to Courts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at 5.
227. In 2009, Due Tan, a Vietnamese refugee living in Thurston County, Washington, also
won a defamation lawsuit after being labeled a Communist sympathizer. Jeremy Pawloski,
Olympia Man Wins Lawsuit Over 'Communist' Label, OLYMPLAN (Olympia, Wash.), Apr. 17,
2009, available at http://www.theolympian.com/southsound/v-print/story/822630.html (last
visited June 9, 2010).
228. Lucas v. Cranshaw, 659 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). This
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workout as posts on websites and social networks created specifically
for niche audiences trigger defamation suits.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertion of Fee noted in the Introduction, 22 9 the First
Amendment, as this Article has illustrated, does not guarantee equal
amounts of freedom of speech to all people in the United States. Using
the areas of obscenity, fighting words and defamation, this Article has
demonstrated that the nature of the audience or particular community
that is the target or intended recipient of speech may affect the amount
of protection that speech receives. Unlike articles that have analyzed
these areas of law separately, this Article has attempted to compare and
contrast them to reveal a larger picture of how courts have drawn
dichotomies in free-speech jurisprudence that pivot on the nature of the
targeted and intended audience.
In all three of the areas examined, the law attempts to make
assumptions about how messages will be interpreted, received, and
experienced by so-called average people. The average-person or
ordinary-person standard is embraced as a baseline to add uniformity to
the laws of obscenity, fighting words, and defamation. Yet it is merely a
fiction, asking fact finders-juries and judges-to guess at what some
mythical average person would think, feel, or understand.
In obscenity law, for instance, most jurors probably do not ask or
poll their neighbors, querying them about their private sexual practices
or what adult content they watch; instead, they guess at what the
average person might think, taking into account every single adult in the
community that they have never even met, which could number into the
millions in large metropolitan areas.
The guessing game is compounded when jurors are asked to
speculate about what a supposed sexual deviant might think about
certain content. This can be especially difficult, when the content in
question is gay pornography, which some homophobic heterosexuals
might find deviant. As Stephen P. Modde, general counsel for gay-male
adult film company Falcon Studios, puts it:
I've lived all over this country and there are very few states
where you can be gay and feel like you're part of the community.
You're an outcast just by being who you are. And it would be
hard to make jurors put themselves in the place of a gay
language was quoted approvingly in July 2009 in Community Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King,
682 S.E. 2d 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
229. Fee, supra note 12, at 1706.
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community member.2 30
The courts thus engage in dueling fictions when they apply a
supposedly singular First Amendment that applies to all citizens. First,
there is the fiction of the average person-an imagined community of
one, to borrow from Anderson's term 2 3 '-derived from a crazy-quilt
fusion of all members of a larger, geographic community. Second, there
is the fiction that all members of an imagined, non-geographic
community-sexual deviants with particular fetishes, public school
teachers, police officers and Vietnamese refugees, to name a few that
this Article has suggested-share the same reactions to messages
targeted toward or about them.
Yet it is here that courts would be wise, in the opinion of the author
of this Article, to draw from the words of U.S. District Judge Patrick J.
Duggan in the student-speech case of Barber v. Dearborn Public

Schools.2 3 2 Judge Duggan, responding to the argument of a principal
that all Arab-Americans at a public high school in Dearborn, Michigan
would respond in the same way to a t-shirt worn by the student-plaintiff,
opined: "As Plaintiffs counsel noted at oral argument, it is improper
and most likely detrimental to our society for government officials,
particularly school officials, to assume that members of a particular
ethnic group will have monolithic views on a subject and will be unable
to control those views." 233 Indeed, courts engage in the same, very
dangerous type of group-think assumptions rejected by Judge Duggan
when they force other judges (via precedent) and layperson jurors to
speculate about how a member of a particular micro-community-one
that they can only imagine-might think about or respond to a particular
message.
The same problem holds true in defamation law.2 34 As Professor
Lyrissa Lidsky of the University of Florida's Levin College of Law
observed:
The substantial and respectable minority standard has a curiously
modern ring to it. The standard ostensibly embodies the
traditional liberal values of tolerance and respect for diversity
necessary in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society. [C]ourts must
230. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Gay Pornographyand the First Amendment:
Unique, First-Person Perspectives on Free Expression, Sexual Censorship, and Cultural
Images, 15 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 687, 706 (2007) (quoting Modde, based on

comments he made during an interview conducted by the authors in September 2006).
231.

See generally ANDERSON, supra note 13.

232. 286 F. Supp. 2d 847 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
233. Id. at 857.
234. Supra text accompanying notes 198-228.
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undertake both a quantitative inquiry to determine whether the
community segment is "substantial" and a normative inquiry to
determine whether it is "respectable." Yet courts rarely resort to
polls, surveys or even witness testimony to determine the values
held by the community segment but instead rely on their own
personal knowledge and intuitive judgments which they
subsequently label common knowledge and common sense.
Hence, a plaintiffs recovery is contingent on neither actual harm
to reputation (due to defamation's anomalous doctrine of
presumed harm) nor an actual community in whose eyes the
plaintiff s reputation has been harmed.
Like the law of obscenity with its mythical average-person standard
and imagined communities of deviants, it all truly boils down to
guesswork and speculation by jurors in defamation law. As Lidsky
argues:
Deciding whether statements have defamatory "tendencies"
requires judges (and sometimes juries) to envision the community
in which the plaintiffs reputation was harmed. The term
"envision" is appropriate, since the community segment
determination is rarely based on objective evidence but is instead
based on (often) unconscious decisions and beliefs about
communities and their values. 2 36
Although never invoking in an interdisciplinary style the notion of
imagined communities explicated by Benedict Anderson, Lidsky taps
into this idea, albeit in her isolated analysis of defamation law (she does
not address either obscenity or fighting words), when she concludes her
article:
Some fictions are useful fictions; some myths are useful myths.
At the heart of the defamation tort lies a myth of a cohesive,
homogeneous community whose norms lend shape and order to
modem life. However, this idealized vision of community life
does not comport well with the fragmented nature of life in a
complex, heterogeneous, multicultural, multiethnic society.
Nonetheless, the myth has the power to shape outcomes in
defamation cases.2 37

235. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71
WASH. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1996).

236. Id. at 36.
237. Id. at 49.

476

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

Adding to the problems in libel law, like that in obscenity and
fighting words, is the deployment of a reasonable or average-reader
perspective. As Professor David McCraw observed in a 1991 law
journal article, such a fictional standard is plagued by its "amorphous
nature." 238
In summary, this Article has cut across obscenity, fighting words and
defamation in order to show the macro-level problems in First
Amendment jurisprudence that occur when judges embrace imagined
communities-both those of the fictional average person and those of
micro-level, non-geographic sub-populations who supposedly are, for
legal purposes, all alike. This Article concludes by raising the question
of which fiction is worse-that of a speculative, mythical average
person to gauge message protection or that of a micro-level imagined
community that is applied by supposedly average jurors? Parsed more
bluntly, which is worse, an imagined community of one (the average
person) or multiple imagined communities that coalesce around
characteristics, beliefs or proclivities?
In considering this question, judges and legal scholars must
recognize that the deployment of multiple micro-communities serves
important functions. For instance, in fighting words, these communities
allow citizens to more vehemently criticize some government officials
(police) in positions of power, while they also allow for lessons of
civility and respect for authority to be taught in public schools (microcommunities of thin-skinned teachers and principals). In libel law, they
recognize the complexity of the meaning process and that different
groups of people will interpret and understand messages differently
based on their shared characteristics. And in obscenity, they
acknowledge that some people do have sexual proclivities that fall
outside those of the supposedly average person.
In an ethnically diverse nation, then, perhaps the law's use of
multiple sub-communities to determine how much protection speech
receives makes sense. But the corresponding problem is a distinct lack
of uniformity in First Amendment jurisprudence that threatens, if
expanded further and taken to its logical extreme, to bring different
standards of speech justice for different groups. For instance, when a
Vietnamese refugee living in Washington State won a defamation
lawsuit in 2009 after he was called a Communist, Matthew Heller
observed that the decision "sends a clear message that First Amendment
protections for political speech may not apply to statements accusing
Vietnamese-Americans of communist sympathies." 23 9 In other words,
238. David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41
CATH. U.L. REv. 81, 99 (1991).
239. Matthew Heller, Jury Says 'Communist' Slur Defamed Vietnam Refugee,
ONPOINTNEWS.COM, Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.onpointnews.com/NEWS/Jury-
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the law is not uniform and the exact same words may be treated
differently, depending on the individual to whom they are directed. The
average-person perspective in the three areas examined in this Article
assumes a one-size-fits-all First Amendment jurisprudence, which
imperfect as it may be, avoids a fractured jurisprudence of particularist
rights.

Finds-Communist-Slur-Defamed-Vietnam-Refugee.html (last visited June 9, 2010).

478

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VoL 20

